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La Dolce Vita-Law and Equity
Merged at Last!
The forms of actions we have buried, but they still rule us from
their graves.
F.W. Maitland, 1909.
Article 5, section 6 (a) of the proposed Constitution of Arkansas of 1970 states simply, "District Courts are established as
trial divisions of the Trial Department. They shall have original
jurisdiction of all justiciable matters not otherwise provided in
this constitution, and such powers of review of administrative
action as may be provided by law." The schedule of the new
document contains temporary provisions going to the scope of
jurisdiction of the present courts by declaring:
The jurisdiction hereby conferred on District Courts shall include all matters previously cognizable by Circuit, Chancery,
and Probate Courts and all judicial matters previously cognizable by County and Common Pleas Courts. The geographic
districts and subject matter divisions of the Chancery and Circuit Courts existing at the time this Constitution takes effect
shall become districts and divisions of the District Court hereby
established until changed pursuant to this Constitution ... 1
With these two succinct sentences of article 5, the drafters
of the proposed constitution are presenting to the voters a
unique opportunity to blaze a new pathway in Arkansas' judicial
frontierland. A question certain to be in the minds of lawyers,
circuit judges, and chancellors, as well as the voters themselves,
is: In what ways and to what extent would adoption of this
proposed constitution alter the patterns of justice in Arkansas?
More particularly, what would be the long and short term results
of fusing courts of law and equity in Arkansas?
Based upon an exegesis of the history of equity as a system
of law, a comparison of Arkansas' present separate courts system
with its own predecessors and with systems of other states,
and, further, based upon an in-depth investigation of the practical and theoretical arguments-both positive and negative-conThe authors wish to acknowledge with gratitude the valuable suggestions and criticisms of the original draft of this manuscript made by
Dean Ralph C. Barnhart and Professor Fredrick K. Spies. Professor
Robert A. Leflar and Chancellor Thomas F. Butt also provided the authors with valuable insights into the discussion area. All views expressed herein, and errors of omission or commission, are solely the
authors' however.'
1. PROPosED Aiu. CONST., schedule III, § 4(b) (1970).
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cerning merger, it will be clearly seen that the merger of law
and equity courts in the State would be neither a panacea for
all judicial woes nor open a Pandora's box of abounding confusion. The merger, if effected, would present some operational
difficulties in its inauguration, but it would ultimately ensure a
more complete form of justice than does the present system.

I.

THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

While some scholars of equity jurisprudence have suggested
that the principles of the English Chancery system, which
reached its maturity in the Elizabethan period, were but an
embodiment of a reception of the Roman aequitas, or "criterion2
of correctness of law" as developed by the praetors of Rome,
others have argued-perhaps more convincingly-that the equitable ideals of conscience, good faith, relief from hardship, morality, and complete justice derive from the Greek philosopher,
3
Aristotle.
2.

JOLLOWICZ,

ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN LAW 56

(1957);

Newman, The Place and Function of Pure Equity in the Structure of
Law, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 406-08 (1965); Oleck, HistoricalNature of Equity
Jurisprudence, 20 FORDHAM L. REv. 26-32 (1951); Re, Roman Contributions to the Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1961). Oleck submits that the concept of equity as the leavening of the strict law had its
roots in the Code of Hammurabi, the Sumerian-Assyrio-Chaldean tablets, the Hebrew civilization, the philosophy of the ancient Greeks, and
the civil and canon law of Rome.
3. In the Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined the Greek word
for equity, epieikeia, as "not the legally just but a correction of legal
justice," or "a correction of law where it is defective owing to its
universality." Thus, the Romans appear to have viewed equity as
something to be found within the positive law-almost a self-correcting mechanism-while the Greeks recognized a need for a set of external, higher principles which would always be necessary to relieve men
from the inevitable harshness of the strict law. Perhaps it is because of
these divergent concepts of equity that equity and law developed as a
single system in those countries of Europe which now have a civil law
system, and as separate systems in England, and consequently, in the
United States. See generally, ARISTOTLE, ETHIcA NICOMACHEA, §§ 1137b51137b30, (ed. W. D. Ross) (London, 1925); CARDOzo, THE GROWTH OF THE
LAW (1924); CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (7th ed.
1908); HOLDSWORTH, 4 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 278 (1924), 5 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 217 (1924); MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 24, 27, 42, 55
(10th

ed.

1884);

MAINE,

DISSERTATIONS

ON EARLY

LAW

AND

CUSTOM

(1883); MAINE, LECTURES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS (1875);
MAITLAND & MONTAGUE, A SKETCH OF ENGLISH HISTORY (1915); MAITLAND,
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1936); NEWMAN, EQUITY AND
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1961); PERRY, COMMON LAW PLEADING
(1897); PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 673 passim
(5th ed. 1956); POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, 26-90 (1940); POUND,
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Regardless of its origins, the expansion of the English Chancery system's jurisdiction, from royal dispensation of favors and
in effect being the "keeper of the King's conscience," to a separate and independent system of jurisprudence, came about because of the resistance of the English common law judges to
changes in their writs and forms of actions. 4 The great struggle
between the courts of law and the prerogative court was not
resolved until the reign of James I (1603-1625), when the quarrel between Chancellor Ellesmere and Chief Justice Coke over
the independence of Chancery was decided in favor of the High
Court of Chancery.5 From that time forward, when there were
conflicts between the rigidity of law and the flexibility of equity,
equity would prevail.6
English courts of law and equity developed in their separate
courses for about five hundred years, until both systems became stiffened with the arthritis of ages of tired formality and
precedent. Thus it was, that in England in the mid-nineteeth
century a reform movement began-partly original, partly borrowed from David Field, the great reformer of New York procedural law. The movement culminated with the Judicature Acts
of 1873 and 1875, which radically simplified procedure and practice in English law, and which sought to abolish, in words at least,
the distinctions between law and equity.7 Whether there has actually been a merger in England of the substances of law and
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 17 passim (1921); VINOGRADOFF, 2 OUTLINE OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 239 passim (1922).

4.

Oleck, supra note 2, at 32.

5. The difference was centered around Lord Coke's acts of restraint to prohibit suitors from going into equity for relief. Ellesmere,
in retaliation, enjoined suitors from pursuing common law judgments
with the end result being an obvious deadlock. In an effort to resolve
the conflict, James I appointed a committee, which included the Attor-

ney General, Sir Francis Bacon, to advise him. Ellesmere emerged the
victor from the struggle when James decreed in favor of Chancery. Although dissension was still to be found between the courts of chancery
and the law courts at various times during the 17th century, Chancery's

position was never seriously assailed after Ellesmere's triumph. PLUCKNETT,

A CONCISE

HISTORY OF THE COMMON

LAW 699 (5th ed. 1956).

See

generally, Smith, Dr. Bonham's Case and the Modern Significance of
Lord Coke's Influence, 41 WASHINGTON L. REV. 297 (1966).
6.

See generally,

HOLDSWORTH,

SOME MAKERS

OF

ENGLISH LAW

(1938); MAITLAND, EQUITY, 1-11 (1909); PLUCKNETT, supra note 5.
7. The Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 brought about a partial procedural fusion. 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125. The Judicature Act of 1873,
which became effective in 1875, provided broadly that, ". . . generally
in all matters not herebefore mentioned, in which there is any conflict
or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law
with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail." 36
& 37 Vict. c. 66, sec. 25(11).
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equity and not merely of the procedures is a question which continues to confound British legal scholars.8
Prior to the American Revolution, equity jurisprudence developed very haphazardly in this country.9 Some colonies had
separate courts of law and equity. Others, notably Massachusetts, failed to establish a separate system, and in some, equity
jurisdiction was vested in a royal governor or his appointee. 10
The possibility of colonial hostility to equity has been suggested
on the theory that it evoked memories of the hated Star Chamber
Court which developed simultaneously with the High Court of
Chancery in England, or that the very notion of equity and of
discretion in the application of law ran counter to the Puritan
ethic." After the Revolution, most of the states established separate courts of equity, even though New England remained reluc-

tant to do

SO.

12

II.

EQUITY IN

ARKANSAS

The history of equity in Arkansas is unique and fascinating.
During the first eighty-four years of Arkansas' existence-as a
territory from 1819 to 1836 and as a state thereafter-almost all
trial work was done in the circuit courts,13 which were authorized to exercise all jurisdiction not otherwise vested. Thus, the
circuit courts necessarily had cognizance of both legal and equitable matters. 14 The 1836 constitution of Arkansas authorized
8.

Delany, Equity and the Law Reform Committee, 24 MOD. L. REV.

116-18 (1961); Evershed, Reflections on the Fusion of Law and Eqvity
after 75 Years, 70 L.Q. REV. 326-31 (1954).
9. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924); PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 673-707 (1956); POUND, ORGANIZATION
OF COURTS, 26-90 (1940); POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 60-84
(1921); Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641
(1923).
10. Id.
11. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 53 (1921).
Dean

Pound notes that there was a hearty spirit of puritanism which could
be found in the Constitution and attributes this to the fact that the Consitution, itself, was the work-product of men who believed in original
sin and were resolved to leave no door open for transgressors which they
could possibly shut.
12. POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, 26-90 (1940).

13. On the question of whether the lower trial courts in Arkansas
should be upgraded before merger is attempted, see ARKANSAS JUDICIARY
COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 1965 GENERAL ASSEMBLY 55. The delegates
to the Arkansas Constitutional Convention apparently followed this
advice in drawing up the county trial courts section of the new document. PROPOSED ARK. CONST., art. 5, § 7 (1970).
14. THE LAWS OF THE TERRIToRY OF ARKANSAS COMPRISING THE OR-

GANIC LAWS OF THE TERRITORIES OF MISSOURI AND ARKANSAS AND THE LAWS
PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF ARKANSAS AT THE
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the legislature to establish separate courts of chancery, 15 but
the General Assembly did not begin to do so until 1855. Perhaps
the reason Arkansas did not immediately establish chancery
courts is that the circuit judges were reluctant to relinquish
their jurisdiction over equitable matters-much as present day
chancellors and judges are reluctant to take on the added responsibility of administering both bodies of law.
It is pertinent, from an historical viewpoint, to note at this
juncture an appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court of a case decided in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County (Chancery side) in
1844, Hempstead & Conway v. Watkins, Adm'r of Byrd,16
wherein Judge Oldham waxed eloquent on the subject of what
effect a legislative grant of concurrent jurisdiction to courts of
SESSIONS IN 1819 AND 1820 at 28, an enactment dated December 21,

1818, states: "Be it enacted by the general assembly of the territory of
Missouri, That in all cases where a remedy cannot be had in the ordinary course of common law proceedings, the Circuit Court in each
county shall possess and exercise chancery jurisdiction, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as the superior court of this territory now
possesses and exercises the same, under the same rules and regulations
which govern the chancery proceedings in said court."
At page 70, Acts passed by the Governor and Judges of the Territory
of Arkansas, reads: All Missouri Territory laws "not repugnant to provisions of the original law of the territory [of Arkansas] shall be and
continue in force as fully and to the same extent so far as applicable
*

. . ,"

dated August 3, 1819.

At page 73, Section 5, enacted August 3, 1819, states: "[The circuit
judges shall exercise the same jurisdiction] which is exercised by the
judges of the circuit courts of the territory of Missouri.
15. ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1836) provides:
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one supreme
court, in circuit courts, in county courts, and in justices of the
peace. The General Assembly may also vest such jurisdiction
as may be deemed necessary in corporation courts, and, when
they deem it expedient, may establish courts of chancery.
Section 6 of the same article provides:
Until the General Assembly shall deem it expedient to establish courts of chancery, the circuit court shall have jurisdiction
in matters of equity, subject to appeal to the supreme court, in
such manner as may be provided by law.
Section 4 of the schedule of article VI states:
All actions at law which now are, or may be pending in any of
the courts of record in the Territory of Arkansas may be commenced in or transferred to any court of record of the State,
which shall have jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof; and
all suits in equity may, in like manner, be commenced in or
transferred to the court having chancery jurisdiction.
Provisions for establishment and maintenance of courts of chancery in
Arkansas may be found in each of the State's five constitutions: ARK.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 4, 6 (1836); ARK. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 6 (1861);
ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 6 (1864); ARK. CONsT. art. VII, § 5 (1868);
ARK. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 11, 15; see also, PROPOSED ARK. CONST. art.
5, § 6(a), schedule III, § 4(b) (1970).
16. 6 Ark. 317 (1844).
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common law would have upon the jurisdiction of equity courts.
It may be also observed that many eminent jurists like those
of former times, entertain great jealously [sic] against courts
of chancery, and generally use all exertions to limit and restrict
them in the exercise of their ancient jurisdiction. But we feel
ourselves constrained to regard the ancient landmarks of the
jurisdiction of chancery, and will endeavor to uphold, so far
as in us lies, that magnificent fabric of judicial ethics, which
has been reared in resplendent majesty by the most profound
geniuses that ever erected a superstructure of human wisdom,
or fashioned a system for the administration of human justice.
We feel no disposition to display a vandal barbarism by lending
a helping hand to demolish and destroy so splendid an edifice,
replete with everything calculated to demand our admiration
and reverence; nor would we remove a single stone or efface
a single feature by which the harmony of the superstructure
might be endangered, or which might mar the beauty of its
fair proportions. For the purpose of fully ascertaining and
clearly expounding the rule upon the question now before us,
we have looked into the recorded wisdom of the sages, by whom
the system of equity jurisprudence was brought into order out
of confusion; and also into the decisions of those courts in
America, which have, with a jealous eye, watched all encroachments upon its boundaries, while they have resisted the exercise
of jurisdiction properly legal by courts of equity, and have, on
all occasions marked out the limits of chancery and asserted its
undoubted prerogatives. While we do not oppose the action of
the legislature in conferring upon courts of law jurisdiction in
matters originally equitable; or courts of law, by their own acts
in disregard of the unmeaning trammels of technical absurdity,
for the administration of strict and comprehensive justice upon
the enlarged and ennobling principles of equity, in granting a
remedy demanded by the clearest principles of right and wrong,
in cases where they would formerly, by adhering to the rigid
rules of the common law, have denied it, we will defend and
sustain courts of chancery in the exercise of their undoubted
jurisdiction, and withstand its being taken from them by force,
7
by the grasping and expansive arms of common law tribunals.'
Since the opinions of the trial courts in the formative period
of Arkansas jurisprudence are not available, little is known of
the attitudes and feelings of the circuit judges who daily had to
deal with two systems of law within a single courtroom. It
must be remembered that in 1844 there had been no reform of
the rules of civil procedure anywhere in the United States and
that the rules of practice and pleading for law and equity were
radically different. Hempstead, considered in this light, is indeed a bold and imaginative landmark defense for the powers
of Chancery.
At approximately the same time that a trend began in other
states to merge their separate courts of law and equity, Arkansas established in 1855 its first court of chancery in Pulaski
17.

Id. at 366.
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County.'- That court was not created because of an onerous
caseload in the circuit court, but rather for the very specific purpose of wresting all the funds remaining in the hands of trustees
of the defunct Arkansas Real Estate Bank. 9 The problem boiled
in an unsettled state from 1842 until 1853, when Judge John J.
Clendennin, circuit judge sitting in chancery, declined to interfere for want of jurisdiction. The Legislature subsequently
passed an act creating the Pulaski County Chancery Court on
January 12, 1855. "Jurisdiction in all matters of chancery were
[sic] transferred from the Circuit Court immediately after the
act was signed and the first session of Pulaski Chancery Court
was convened February 6, 1855, at 3 p.m. in the Senate cham20
ber.'
Almost immediately thereafter, the Attorney General filed
for a writ of quo warranto against Chancellor Hulbert F. Fairchild, "to show to what authority he exercises the office of chancellor and assumes to exercise a separate Court of Chancery
jurisdiction, aside and apart from the Circuit Court in and for
the county of Pulaski."'21 The Pulaski Chancery Court was held
to be constitutional shortly thereafter by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. 22 One final interesting fact about the court is that, although the office of chancellor was made elective, no chancellor
was elected until Frank H. Dodge stood for re-election in 1940.
"This was not in defiance of the constitution but because it so
happened each chancellor had been appointed to fill an unex'28
pired term of his predecessor.

III. A CONTINUING SAGA
Arkansas' first constitution served the State for 25 years
after statehood was achieved in 1836, and then in the turmoil and
aftermath of the Civil War, the State adopted new constitutions
in 1861, 1864, 1868, and 1874. Pursuant to very similar enabling
18. Greenebaum, Arkansas' Judiciary: Its History and Structure,
18 ARK. L. REV. 152, 156 (1964).

19. Sherwood, Pulaski Chancery Court, The Arkansas Gazette, April
5, 1942 (Sunday Magazine, p.3). Miss Sherwood writes: "Governor Yell,
in 1842, displayed the situation before the legislature 'in a strong light,'
declaring that when the Board of Directors of the bank made assignment to a Board of Trustees (like taking money from one pocket to put
into another), the affairs of the bank were 'put beyond the scrutiny and
control of the state, although the state remained responsible for the
payment of interest on the bonds.'"
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. State v. Fairchild, 15 Ark. 619 (1855).
23. Sherwood, supra note 19, at 12.
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clauses in each of those documents, the General Assembly established several chancery courts in counties where they were
24
deemed desirable.
Undoubtedly, the greatest reform in Arkansas law occurred
in 1868 with the adoption of the Civil Code, 25 which was based
on Kentucky's Code and which was in turn part of the great
legal reform movement instituted by David Field in New York
in 1848. In the Code, Arkansas abolished the forms of action
and put in their place the Civil Action. 26 Unlike most of the
Code states, Arkansas retained its few separate courts of law
and equity. But a great step on the road to merger was made by
the Code's abolition of the distinctions between legal and equitable actions. Dean Ralph Barnhart has summarized the change
which the Code effected:
Here again it seems that the important thing in the minds
of the code drafters was to relieve the pleader from having
to decide at his peril that his action was one at law or in
equity and be turned out of court if the judge disagreed with
his choice. As with the forms of action, the one form of action
provision of the codes did not pretend to change the primary
rights and duties previously enforceable in the separate courts,
nor was it intended to change the final relief granted. What
was intended was to abolish the peculiar characteristics of legal
or equitable actions in their manner of commencement and
pleading. Hence both legal and equitable actions are commenced in the same way, utilize the same pleadings
and are
27
generally conformable to the same procedural rules.
Dean Barnhart asserts that the difference between judicial
systems with a single court and Arkansas' separate courts system
is "more apparent than real," in that the states with unified systems set up separate dockets, jury and equity dockets, while
Arkansas "simply tries these dockets in separate courts. '28 The
equalizing mechanism is the statutory provision for automatic
transfer to the correct court of actions erroneously filed in the
wrong court with ease of transfer thereby being guaranteed. 29
Although this statute would appear to guarantee transfer of actions between the courts, it has been pointed out that in practice
30
the transfer is far from automatic.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(1952).
28.
29.
30.
LAWS,

Supra note 15.
ARK. STAT. ANN.
ARK. STAT. ANN.

§§

27-101 through 27-2507 (Repl. 1962).

§ 27-201 (Repl. 1962).

Barnhart, Pleading Reform in Arkansas, 7 ARK. L. Rsv. 1, 15
See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-215 (Repl. 1962).
Id. at 16.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-208 (Repl. 1962).
See LEFLAR, A TREATISE ON THE ARKANSAS LAW OF CONFLICT OF
§ 191, nn. 93-97 (1938).
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The Arkansas General Assembly created a statewide chancery court system by Act 166 of 1903, which provided that, "Separate courts of chancery are hereby established in every county
in the State of Arkansas."'31 Reasons behind this legislative action are probably speculative at best, but it has been stated that
the impetus was at least partly political: the chancellorships
which immediately became available were first filled by executive appointment by Governor Jeff Davis, and were ripe plums
32
for those who had gained the Governor's favor.
From 1903 to 1970, few substantial changes in the law-equity
system were realized in Arkansas. Most alterations concerned
the chancery districts: adding new ones, increasing or decreasing
their size and composition, and in a few cases adding an extra
chancellor to take care of heavy caseloads which built up-especially in Pulaski County.
Within recent years it has become clear that the caseloads
of some chancery (and circuit) districts are much heavier than
others. Under the 1874 constitution, it is possible for chancellors and circuit judges to exchange circuits for the purpose of
expediting the disposition of cases. It has been pointed out that
under the proposed constitution, since all chancellors and judges
would be on equal footing from the beginning (e.g., all would be
judges empowered to hear cases both at law and in equity), there
would be a greater opportunity for, and possibility that, some
temporary switching of judges to heavily crowded dockets could
33
be achieved.
Under the present system, most chancellors seldom hear
law cases and most circuit judges seldom try equity cases. Under the proposed constitution divisions of the District Court
may be established permanently by the Supreme Court,3 4 and
law and equity divisions are declared by the schedule of the
document to exist "until changed pursuant to this constitution. '35 If the proposed constitution is adopted, and if, as is
probable, the supreme court acquiesces in the creation of law
and equity divisions, it is likely that the present chancery
31. Now compiled in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-401 (1947). As of January 1, 1969, there were sixteen chancery districts in the state of Arkansas.
32. Speech by Robert A. Leflar, President of the Arkansas Constitutional Convention, made at the University of Arkansas Law School,
Fayetteville, Arkansas, February 25, 1970.
33. Id.
34. PROPOSED ARK. CONST., art. 5, § 4(d) (1970).
35. Id. schedule III, § 4(b) (1970). Under this section divisions
such as family law, probate, and criminal law could also be established.
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judges would be assigned to the equity divisions and that the
current circuit judges would be assigned to the law divisions.3 6
Assuming that the foregoing prediction is a reasonable one, it
appears that the change in the administration of justice under
the proposed merged system would be "in name only"-chancellors would be formally designated as judges, even though they
are commonly referred to as judges today, and everything else
would operate as it does presently, at least in the short runwhich might well be defined as the lifetimes of all present
chancellors and circuit judges who would accede to judgeships
under the new system.
If the changes envisaged by those who advocate unification
of chancery and law courts in Arkansas are to be in name only,
for the time being, the question might well be raised, Why
merge? The answer is that the greatest benefits from merger
will be realized only in the future. These benefits can best be
understood if some knowledge of the philosophical ideal of the
merged system is posited. That system, very simply, would have
a single court, a single judge, one procedure, and a free exchange
of the substantive matter of law and equity. 37 As can be seen

immediately, this construct is dramatically removed from the old
36. See note 32 supra.

37. See generally

WALSH, EQUITY 36-39, 97-131 (1930); Bordwell,
The Resurgence of Equity, 1 U. Cm. L. REV. 741, 749-50 (1934); Rundell,
The Chancellor's Foot: The Nature of Equity, 27 U. KAN. CITY L. REV.
71, 84-85 (1958); Sedler, Equitable Relief, But Not Equity, 15 J. LEGAL
ED. 293, 298 (1963); Pound, Introduction to NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 9 (1961); Newman, The Place and Function of Pure
Equity in the Structure of Law, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 401 (1965) and especially at 410, wherein Professor Newman expresses great admiration for
the civil law as exemplifying the ideal merged system:
Now that law is no longer sacred and unchangeable, there
is no further need to resort to forces outside the law in order to
correct instances of failure of justice. The rules of law open to
receive the doctrines of equity, and the correction of law comes
about within the law itself. At this stage in the evolution of
law there is no longer need for an equitable system separate
from the main body of the law. Equity loses its separate identity; eluity and law coalesce, and equity becomes an integral
part of a unitary legal system. The most perfect expression of
this stage in the evolution of law is the civil law, in which
there is only one set of norms, designed, so far as public order
and the social interest in the stability of transactions do not forbid, to provide for just solutions of all situations which may
arise. This union of law and equity has not yet been reached
in Anglo-American law, in which the long experience of administration of equity in a separate inner judicial system has created a moral curtain, now heavy with the mold of centuries,
which hangs across our law, shutting off the principles of
equity from the greater part of the law.
See also Newman, The Role of Equity in the Harmonization of Legal
Systems, 13 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 11 (1963).
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English system of chancery and law courts which existed prior
to 1873, in which there were separate courts, separate judges,
radically different procedures, and mutually exclusive bodies of
substantive law and remedies.
Where does Arkansas fit into this scheme? From a onecourt, one-judge, two-procedures, and two-substances system in
1836, Arkansas slowly began moving toward the present system,
which is two-court, two-judge, two-substances, and one-procedure. The major steps along the way to this present system, as
has been seen in the preceding brief history, were the establishment of a separate chancery court in Pulaski County in 1855, the
major procedural reforms of the 1868 Civil Code, and finally the
institution of a full two-court system on a state-wide basis in
1903.
Of the factors considered above-courts, judges, procedures,
and substances-the most difficult in which to achieve complete
merger is substance. The substance of the law is found in the
statutes and the common law and relies upon adherence to precedent with a considerable degree of strictness. In most law cases,
the parties are entitled to a jury trial on questions of fact. Alternatively, the substantive nature of equity inheres in its flexibility: equity is supposed to make special allowances for the
particularities of each case. Although it has hundreds of years
of precedent by now, equity is not absolutely tied to that precedent. The parties in an equity suit are not entitled to a jury
trial, although either may request an advisory jury, the empanelling of which is entirely discretionary with the chancellor.

IV. A SIMPLE UNION?
The practical and constitutional difficulties of fusing the
substantive elements of law and equity are clear and possibly
even insurmountable: the law is static and equity is dynamic.
It is well to note, however, that equity, as an element of social
reform in society, is no longer such a driving, vital force. The
various state legislative bodies instead are today serving the role
as reform agents that equity originally enjoyed. As Professor
Simpson has observed:
[I]t would be idle to suppose that such fusion of legal and
equitable procedure is equivalent to a complete merger of law
Moreover, there are differences between speand equity ....
cific and substitutional relief, between a discretionary and a
rigid application of remedies, between controversies suitable
to determination by a jury and those not so suitable whether
by reason of complexity or otherwise, which will survive any
changes in procedural forms. Equity continues to exist though
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separate equity practice disappears.38

When he wrote those words in 1936, Simpson predicted the
complete demise of separate equity practice in the United States
would occur within fifty years.8 0 It seems rather optimistic to
believe that prophecy-for even under the proposed constitution
of Arkansas, equity practice would for the most part remain
separate in fact, if not in name, for a good many years to come.
So long as there are separate law and equity judges, attorneys
will be required to distinguish between the legal and equitable
nature of the subject matter out of which their cases arise.
The bromide that, "old habits die hard," is probably the greatest
obstacle to rapid and sweeping fusion of law and equity in Ar40
kansas.
Among legal scholars there appears to be a considerable
difference of opinion as to what merger is supposed to effect.
Some expect and look forward to the ideal system, 41 while others
are satisfied with a fusion of procedures. 42 Finally, there are
those who take what might be called the most realistic view:
recognizing that complete fusion is practically impossible, but
nonetheless believing that there can always be improvement of
the present system. 48 This latter approach, it is submitted, is
what the drafters of the proposed constitution have pursued.
If the proposition is accepted that all deliberate efforts
should be made in striving to attain the ideal legal system, then
38. Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HAIRV. L. REV. 171,
180 (1936).

39. Id. at 248.
40. See Delany, supra note 8, at 117, which appears to express the
same idea from the British standpoint:
The truth of the matter is, of course, that the procedural
fusion and the abolition of the distinction between the separate
tribunals have not affected the difference in genesis between
the rules evolved in those tribunals. The different technical approach to these rules, and the differences in the training of the
men who practise in the separate fields, as has been pointed
out by the present Master of the Rolls, will continue to militate against substantive fusion. ...
41. See generally note 37 supra, and the works cited therein.
42. Id.
43. Bordwell, supra note 37, at 750, where it is asserted that:
Some, no doubt, have looked for a complete fusion of law
and equity both as to rights and remedies. It would seem a
great loss if it were so. There is need for the active principle in
the law as well as the static. But no one, it is believed, claims
that the procedure acts, in wiping out the separate courts of
equity and the separate suit in equity, had any such immediate
object. The immediate object was frankly procedural. It was
only carrying one step further the reform by which the common
law actions were abolished. The abolition of the common law
forms of action was not intended to change the substantive law.
Incidentally, no doubt, much substantive law was affected.
Likewise, with the elimination of the separate suit in equity.
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perhaps the validity of one of the arguments in favor of merger
is more manifest: namely, that the law can best absorb equitable
principles if it is always administered in the same court by the
same judge.
A real merger of the substantive rules of law and equity necessarily results from the merger of courts and of procedure. It
has always been true that in cases of conflict between law and
equity, . . . the rule in equity has been the only real law, the

opposing rule at law being illusory and with no real force and
effect, since it will be ineffective, and the enforcement of such
a rule at law will be restrained by equity's power in personam
over the parties to the controversy. The bringing together of
the rules of law and equity in the same court and in the same
form of action, to the end that complete relief both legal and
equitable may be given in the same suit, results necessarily in

overthrowing the illusory and conflicting rule at law and the
establishment
of the rule in equity as the controlling law of the
44
case.
Some critics have charged that the merger plan is merely
change for the sake of change-pointing out that Arkansas has
survived for ninety-six years (or sixty-seven years, counting
from the establishment of a statewide chancery system in 1903)
under the present system and might as well keep it. One chancellor has opined that if the proposed constitution were adopted,
over 90% of all law and equity cases would be disposed of exactly
as they are presently. 45 The beauty of the present system, he asserts, is that it is automatic: the lawyer files his suit in either
the circuit court or the chancery court, and he knows at once
whether he may recover damages or obtain specific relief,
whether a jury trial is possible, and who the judge-or chancellor
-will be. 46 Any difficulties arising as a consequence of an erroneous choice of court can easily be remedied by a transfer to the correct one. 47 If the merged system were adopted,
the chancellor believes that confusion would result over the
assignment of the case to the proper "side" or division of the
court, as well as over which issues would take precedence in cases
where both legal and equitable questions are involved. 48 The
problem of when a defendant is entitled to a jury as of right and
when at the court's discretion would also arise, according to such
49
critics.
44.
45.
kansas,
46.

Walsh, supra note 37, at 38.
Interview with Chancellor Thomas F. Butt, Fayetteville, ArFebruary 16, 1970.
Id.
47. Id. But see LEFLAR, supra note 30.
48.

Id.

49. See Fraser, The Effect of the Merger of Law and Equity on the
Right to Trial by Jury, 21 OKLA. S.B.J. 561 (Mar. 26, 1960), for enlighten-
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An additional disadvantage under the proposed system might
arise when an attorney, knowing that the district court would
have to assign his case to the appropriate side of the court, would
tend to be sloppy in drafting his complaint or answer, or for tactical reasons even attempt to delude the court into assigning his
case to the wrong side. In answer to this possible detriment, it is
asserted that the present chancellors and judges in their new
positions as District Judges would not tolerate such conduct, but
would still continue to require a clear presentation of the issues
in the pleadings. If this were so, then the problem of assigning
cases to the proper side of the court would be no more difficult
than keeping separate dockets for the separate courts is presently. In any event, lawyers today draft their pleadings with
the same tactical purposes in mind, seeking to establish jurisdiction in one court or the other in keeping with what they conceive to be their own advantage.
The Arkansas Constitutional Revision Study Commission, in
its report to the Governor in 1968, said on the question of merger:
The inconsistency of separate jurisdictions is demonstrated
by the fact that the Supreme Court reviews both law and
equity matters without difficulty. There seems to be no good
reason why one trial judge could
not consider matters arising
in each of these areas of the law.5 0
It is submitted that the position taken here by the Study Commission is somewhat oversimplified. There is a major difference
between the supreme court and the circuit and chancery courts.
The supreme court is an appellate court, in which a jury
is never employed. The circuit and chancery courts-which
would become known as the district court under the proposed
constitution-are trial courts, in the former of which a jury
trial is of right, and in the latter of which a jury is only
advisory and is employed solely at the discretion of the chancellor. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., expressed the thought
rather cogently when he said the guarantee of jury trial "is the
sword in the bed that prevents the complete union of law and
equity."5 1
ing comments on the "paramount issue" test developed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to resolve the question of whether an action containing both legal and equitable claims is predominantly legal or predominantly equitable, and thus to place the case for trial by jury or
by the court.
50.
ING

ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY COMMISSION, REVIs-

THE ARKANSAS

CONSTITUTIoN-A

REPORT

TO THE

GOVERNOR

73

(1968).

51. CHAFEE & RE,CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY 24 (5th ed. 1967).
See also Chafee, Foreword in RE, Sa.EcTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY iv (1955),
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If the proposition were accepted that for the foreseeable future in Arkansas there would continue to be separate sides of
the district courts and-perhaps more importantly-separate
judges, then the jury problem would not arise any more often
than it does under the present system. Sometime in the distant
future, when there may be areas of the State in which a single
district judge could, and would-for purposes of convenience
and economy-handle all cases, both legal and equitable, the
problem of his deciding whether the case is predominantly at
law or in equity might arise. It is submitted, however, that
the proposed system contains the needed flexibility to remedy
52
any such difficulties.
At this juncture, yet another statement by the Study Commission is relevant:
Experience in the other states, nearly all of which have combined law and equity jurisdiction, indicates that a single trial
level jurisdiction is quite satisfactory.58
This, too, is a rather broad generalization. To understand why,
a cursory examination of the classes of equity jurisdiction which
exist in the United States today is essential. There are three
main classes: (1) Those in which equity is administered in a
separate court from law and by a different procedure, 4 (2)
Those in which both jurisdictions are vested in a single court,
but which court has separate sides or divisions, 55 and (3) Those
where he states:
There is only one genuine reason today for distinguishing
an action at law from a suit in equity-the constitutional right
to a jury trial in civil cases. I recognize some advantages in
that time-honored method of settling disputes, but people are
getting so busy that I wonder whether we can afford to use that
method much longer. As waivers of juries become more frequent, the antique barrier will become barely discernible.
52. Perhaps the "paramount issue" test referred to in Fraser, supra
note 49, could be adopted in Arkansas to relieve this problem if and
when it should arise.
53.

ARKANSAS CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY

COMMISSION,

supra

note 50, at 73.
54. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 9, 10 (Williams, 1934); MISS. CONST. §§ 156,
157, 159; DEL. CONST., art. 4, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 341, 342, 343,
541 (1953); CHAFEE & RE, supra note 51, at 16, include Arkansas.
Joiner and Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55 MICH. L. REV. 1059,
1110-14 (1957) include VT. STAT. §§ 1277, 1278, 1400 (1947).
55. CHAFEE & RE, supra note 51, at 16, list the following states:
Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,

New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Joinder and Geddes, supra note 54, at 1110-14, however, list the following: ALA. CODE tit. 13, §§ 126, 129 (1940); FLA. CONST., art. 5, § 11;
ILL. CONST., art. 6, § 12; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 110, §§ 31, 101.1 (1955); IOWA
CODE § 611.3 (1954); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 107,

§ 2 (1954); MD. CODE
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in which equity is administered in the same court and by the
same procedure as law. 56 Since every state has its own peculiar
history and needs, and since there are changes constantly being
made in the administration of justice across the country, it is
almost impossible to correctly categorize every state into one
of these classes.
Arkansas is a good example of the difficulty which arises in
classification. 57 Upon first blush, the State would appear to belong to the first class. Yet, when it is remembered that the
Civil Code provides for automatic transfer and for a single form
of practice and pleading, it is seen that the procedures of law
and equity are at one with each other.
art. 16, § 102; art. 75, § 125 (Flack, 1951); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
c. 212, §§ 3, 4; c. 214, §§ 1-4 (1956); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 611.1 (1948);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 491.7, 498.1 (1955); N.J. CONST., art. 6, § 3;
ANN.

ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 11.010, 11.020 (1955); PA. R. Civ. P. 1501, 1502 (1954);
R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 496, §§ 6, 7 (1938); VA. CODE §§ 8-138, 17-123 (1950);
W. VA. CONST., art. 8, § 12; W. VA. CODE § 5196 (1955).
56. CHAFEE & RE, supra note 51, at 16, list the following states:

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New

York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
Joiner and Geddes, supra note 54, at 1110-14, however, list the following: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. 2 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27201 (Repl. 1962); CAL. CODE Crv. P. ANN. § 307 (Deering 1953); CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN., R. Crv. P. 2 (1951); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7738, 7813,
7819 (1949); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-104, 37-901, 37-902 (1936); IDAHO CODE
§ 5-101 (1948); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-101 (Burns,1946); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-201 (Corrick, 1949); Ky. R. Civ. P. 2 (1953); MINN. R. Civ. P.
FOR DIST. CT. 2.01 (1952); Mo. REV. STAT. § 506.040 (1949); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 93-2301 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (1943); NEV. COmP.
LAWS § 8500 (1929); N.M. R. CiV. P. FOR DIST. CT. 2 (1953); N.Y. CIv.
PRAc. ACT. § 8 (Cahill-Parsons, 1955); N.C. CONST., art. 4, § 1; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-9 (1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 32-0109 (1953); OHmO REV. CODE §
2307.02 (Baldwin, 1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 10 (1951); S.C. CODE § 10-8
(1952); S.D. CODE § 33.0101 (1939); TEx. CONST., art. 5, § 8; UTAH CONST.,
art. 8, § 19; UTAH R. Civ. P. 2 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.04.020 (1951);
WIS. STAT. § 260.08 (1955); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 3-301 (1945).
Joiner and Geddes did not include Alaska and Hawaii in their compila-

tion of statutes, since neither had become a state at the time the survey
was made. Louisiana was also omitted from their list.

57. The confusing nature of Arkansas' judicial history is illustrated
by comparing the various editions of Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence,
section 42: in the 1881 edition, Arkansas is listed as having two jurisdictions but only one tribunal; both the 1905 and 1918 editions place

Arkansas in the category of states having one court and one procedure;
and the 1941 edition interlinearly notes that Arkansas does have separate courts of law and equity. As stated in note 54, supra, CHAFEE &
RE classified Arkansas as having two courts and two procedures.
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Earlier it was observed that in some respects Arkansas'
courts system was unique. Nowhere is that fact better illustrated than by comparing some of the salient features of Arkansas' equity administration with those of the other three
states listed as having separate courts and separate procedures.
In Delaware, Tennessee, and Mississippi, joinder of claims for
legal and equitable relief is not permitted.58 In Arkansas, such
joinder is permissible. 59 In the other three states the presentation of an equitable defense in actions for legal relief is not permitted. 60 In Arkansas, such a defense is not only permitted,
but it is required to be presented in the defendant's answer. 61
And, finally, in the other "unmerged" states, there can be no
equitable counterclaim in actions for legal relief. 62 Again, Ar63
kansas not only permits it, but requires it.
In view of the above discrepancies, perhaps Arkansas should
be placed in the second class, by recognizing that instead of calling our separate jurisdictions "sides" we call them "courts."
But even this is inaccurate. For, in Oregon, which is a state
having separate sides in a single court, there is no specific authorization of joinder of legal and equitable causes, and the
6 4
Oregon Supreme Court has not upheld such joinder.
The principal difference between Arkansas and other states
in this class is that Arkansas has separate judges. As the comparison with Oregon demonstrates, Arkansas is more progressive
in some ways than those states which have one court and one
judge. Vermont, which is often placed in the first class because
it has separate courts of law and equity, is actually a better
example of the second class because (a) the same judges sit in
both law and equity courts, (b) cases are easily transferred between courts, and (c) there is only one form of action. 65 Should
Arkansas adopt the proposed Constitution, the State would undoubtedly be moved into the second class.
The great majority of the states are classified as having
abolished all distinctions between law and equity courts and
procedures. But when some investigation is made of the states
which are so classified, it comes to light that Arkansas has a
58. Joiner and Geddes, supra note 54, at 1110-14.
59. Aax. STAT. ANN. § 27-1301 (Repl. 1962).
60. Supra note 58.
61. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1121 (Repl. 1962).
62.

Supra note 58.

63. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 27-1121 (Repl. 1962).
64. See Denney, The Separation of Law and Equity in Oregon, 4
WILLAMETTE L.J. 18, 19 (1966).
65. CHAFEE & RE supra note 51, at 16.
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more merged system in some ways than do some of those jurisdictions.
In New York, the birthplace of the Field Code and the vanguard of merger and reform, after over one hundred years of
operation under a unified system, distinctions still remain; in
fact, the New York courts' experience has been reported as being
a "bewildering diversity of result." 66 In groups of cases brought
in equity when they should have been brought at law, the courts
have sometimes granted legal relief, sometimes transferred the
case to the trial calendar for jury trial, and sometimes dismissed
the case entirely, which forces the plaintiff to bring an altogether
new action at law, fraught with such pitfalls as the tolling of the
67
statutes of limitation.
In 1848 the reformers in New York recognized three principal difficulties in achieving a uniform procedure in cases theretofore cognizable at law and in equity: (1) the form of the judgment and the means of enforcing it are quite different at law
and in equity, (2) the modes of pleading in the two systems were
quite at variance with each other-habit and familiarity with
the old methods breed insistence upon theories of pleading,6
and (3) the requirements of jury trial in law actions and trial by
the court in equity actions are almost irreconcilable because of
constitutional mandates.
None of these difficulties have
withered away through the simple fiat action of statutory merger
-even after more than one hundred years under the Field
Code. 69
Finally, Michigan, which is also in the "totally merged"
category, does not allow joinder of legal and equitable causes of
action, and does not permit assertion of equitable defenses or
counterclaims to actions at law. 70 Thus, in its procedural rigidity, Michigan resembles the unmerged states of Mississippi,
Tennessee, and Delaware. Arkansas, although it still has a
two-court system, can afford more complete justice than can
Michigan in one court.

66.

Note, Law and Equity in New York-Still Unmerged, 55 YALE

L.J. 826, 828 (1946).
67.

Id.

68. Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1
SYRACUSE L. REv. 186, 206 (1949). See also note, supra note 66, at 827.
69. Id.

70. Joiner and Geddes, supra note 54. But see King, The Union of
Law and Equity: A Dissent, 37 MICH. S.B.J. 10 (April 10, 1958), which
is a direct response to the Joiner and Geddes article.
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CONCLUSION

From a reconstruction of the history of equity jurisprudence
from ancient to modern times, with some knowledge of the types
of systems presently found in the United States, and in the
light of some of the arguments for and against merger, what
can rightly be determined about the need for and possibilities of
changing the present methods of administering justice in Arkansas?
First, it is seen that no state-nor any nation, for that matter
-has attained a level of ideal merger of law and equity. Secondly, Arkansas, although sometimes erractically, has in reality
moved toward the ideal system of complete justice since its beginning as a state, and at the present time it is in a better position, relatively speaking, than some states whose systems are, on
their faces at least, more merged than our own. Thirdly, it is
clear that if the proposed new system were adopted there would
be several immediate, but for the most part temporary, problems: changing the names of courts, eliminating the title of
chancellor, instituting a system of assigning cases to the proper
side of the court, and in some instances acclimating judges to
hearing both legal and equitable cases. 7 1 Finally, major alterations in the legal system of Arkansas under the proposed revision
would occur gradually and over a period of time: 72 absorption
of equitable principles and remedies into the common law, conversion from a two-judge system to one in which a single judge
hears all cases, and increased utilization of provisions allowing
transfer of judges to relieve overcrowded dockets.
It is submitted that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages, and that Arkansas would ultimately benefit from
this further step on the road to merger of law and equity.
If the proposed constitution is adopted by the voters in November 1970, perhaps in another one hundred years Arkansas will

71. Speech delivered by Mr. John I. Smith, Washington County
Delegate to the Arkansas Constitutional Convention, at the University
of Arkansas Law School in Fayetteville, Arkansas, February 25, 1970.
Mr. Smith remarked that in several sparsely populated areas of Arkansas it would even now be practicable to allow one judge to hear both
law and equity cases. He particularly stressed the waste of time and the
expense which occur under the present system, with circuit and chancery judges traveling their circuits to hear only one or two cases, and
suggested that one man could do both jobs more efficiently.
72. See ARKANSAS JUDICIARY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 1965 GENERAL ASSEMBLY 55.
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approach very near to the ideal system of one court, one judge,
one procedure, and one substance: La Dolce Vita!
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